THE NEW REPUBLIC

School Integration

The Seven Lean Years

Alexander M. Bickel

If Laos Is Lost, What Next?

Denis Warner

In Search of a Moral Style

Irving Howe

China at the Door

The Editors

September 25, 1961,

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Clues About the Bargain

★ Secretary of State Rusk has been almost fanatically secretive about planning for negotiations with the Soviet Union over Berlin and Germany. He contends that there is no point in preparing lead-off proposals and fall-back positions if their terms are to be leaked to the press or carried around the world at Sputnik speed by diplomatic grapevine. The fall-back positions, when they are broadcast in advance, become the basis for initial negotiations; there is no latitude for strategic retreat; and the USSR is given an enormous advantage at the conference table.

Nobody questions the sense of this. Yet complete secrecy is dangerous too. It tends to create the impression at home and abroad that the United States considers preservation of the *status quo* a moral imperative. The Kennedy Administration knows that it will have to give some ground if it is to get satisfactory assurances that Berlin won't be the pain in the world's neck it has been in the past.

Misconceptions about the US position won't be allayed merely by statements about what its policy is not. There must be some discussion of what it is. This discussion need not be so specific that it gives the game away before the opening play. It must, however, give some clues about the bargain we are prepared to strike. Otherwise home opinion – and world opinion – will be dangerously unprepared for any accommodation – no matter how reasonable it might be.

If by some magic, Kennedy and Khrushchev could get together tomorrow and enter into a compact reaffirming the West's free access to West Berlin and recognizing, informally if not formally, that two Germanys exist, there would be an unholy outcry in this country against this "appeasement" of the Soviet Union. And there will be when an agreement finally is negotiated unless the Administration makes more of an effort than it has up to now to lay foundations for public understanding of alternatives open to us.

Too Dangerous

★ Right now even a return to the Herter proposals to reduce Western garrisons in Berlin and to curtail propaganda activities would be regarded as near-treason by the considerable and apparently growing segment of public opinion which holds, along with ex-President Eisenhower, that there isn't anything to negotiate in Berlin. The implacable state of mind of these people was revealed in a letter recently written to President Kennedy by Sen. Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia (and, of course, made public by the Senator). Byrd said he had read an article which appeared in *The Washington Post* suggesting that the State Department was preparing to "give" concessions because of "the inherently exposed and therefore weak Western geographical position in West Berlin." Since the President obviously couldn't condone such an intention, said Byrd, he would doubtless want to "houseclean" the State Department to get rid of "the appeasers."

Meanwhile, Senator Dodd of Connecticut demanded an investigation of the United States Information Agency, and dismissal of Ralph K. White, one of its specialists on Soviet Affairs, for advocating better understanding of the Soviet Union and the mentality of its citizens in a speech before the American Psychological Association. What is needed in the United States, White had said, was "tough-minded empathy – not a sneaking sympathy for the Soviet cause but a realistic, imaginative understanding of how the whole world looks from the Communist point of view, as a preliminary to a critical dissection of that point of view."

Dodd felt that anyone who advocated *this* is too dangerous to have around Washington.

It would be easy to dismiss Byrd and Dodd in these two outbursts as spokesmen for a crackpot fringe – those who seem just to have discovered that Communism is evil, who wonder why nobody has ever found it out before and who want to do something about it now that they are in the know.

But their ranks are expanding for some reason nobody in Washington has quite figured out. They don't join the John Birch Society but they believe much of its nonsense. They don't have a respectful fear of atom bombs or anything else. They want the President to permit no compromise in Berlin.

Dag Hammarskjold

★ Hammarskjold's appalling death in Africa blasts the lid off a Pandora's box. So long as he was there, Soviet pressure to remove him and to fragmentize the UN Secretariat could be resisted. Now, the Security Council must try to reach unanimous agreement on his successor. It is impossible at this tragic moment to think of any man who would be acceptable to all sides.

Notes

★ No decision has been reached on the designation of an appointee to head up the newly-consolidated Agency for International Development. The White House may yet decide not to go through with the appointment of George Woods. And the job has been turned down by John McCloy, Thomas Watson, Henry Alexander and others. ICA's Henry Labouisse was once told he would get the job, but he was not on the list recommended to Kennedy by the State Department. "Not tough enough," was the informal explanation. The suggestion that Woods be appointed ran into trouble in the Senate because of his connection with the Dixon-Yates contract. . . . Conservative Republican leaders in Congress are cozying up to Governor Rockefeller. Senator Dirksen of Illinois and Representative Halleck of Indiana, the team of "Ev and Charlie," recently gave him a luncheon at the Capitol. Some of the conservatives think Rockefeller is more likely to be the next GOP Presidential nominee than Richard Nixon. Few of them concede Senator Barry Goldwater any chance.

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China at the Door

The General Assembly – in a state of semi-shock at the death of Dag Hammarskjold – must nevertheless soon debate, for the 11th time, the question of Chinese representation in the UN. This time it is going to be faced and voted on directly instead of being considered, as heretofore, under a parliamentary device in the form of a proposal not formally to consider it. It has been reduced, moreover, to an either/or choice. None of the various two-China formulas for papering over the problem ever came to life. Neither the regime on Taiwan nor that on the mainland would consent to membership as a sort of adjunct China. Each must claim the whole franchise in the name of the Republic of China specified in the Charter.

An Assembly vote to open the door to a Peking delegation would mean *ipso facto* the exclusion of the Taiwan delegation. UN membership would then probably lose its value to the Nationalist regime as a symbol supporting its asserted exclusive right to be considered the Government of China. Its withdrawal from the Security Council would presumably follow in course. It is most improbable that the Peking regime, on the other hand, would consent to send a delegation to the Assembly unless also tendered the Chinese seat in the Security Council. Peking's consent to participate in the UN, even if that condition were met, is by no means certain. Its spokesmen have intermittently and informally stipulated other conditions – notably satisfaction of Peking's demand for access to and possession of Taiwan and abandonment of United States defense of the position.

When all the complexities of the question – including the difficulties of seating a government which is disposed to exact an enormous price for its presence – have been aired in debate, a majority of the Assembly may decide to keep the *status quo* for the time being. A majority may also decide that the substantive problems justify treating the issue as an important question under Article 18 of the Charter, requiring a two-thirds vote for settlement, instead of a simple procedural question of credentials. Either of these courses might be accompanied by the device of referring the matter to a special committee for study and a deferred report; but it will take all of Ambassador Stevenson's persuasiveness to steer the Assembly this way.

For 10 years the US and the Chinese Nationalist Government have been the mainstays of the impediment to debate – informally called the moratorium. A yielding by either at any time would have brought the impediment down, and the opening of the Assembly's doors to a

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"Listen – When I Get Through With It, It Won't Be Worth Belonging To"

Peking delegation would have been a foregone conclusion. Sustaining the moratorium has been an arduous task – first because of the sparseness of zeal for the cause among other governments, second because of the unrewarding nature of the issue and third because of cumulative loss of headway.

The unrewarding character of the China debate is inherent. The upper limit of US achievement has been to keep the issue from being decided against it. By the same token, adversary interests could scarcely lose: any final settlement could only be their way.

The loss of headway has been in relative strength for the US position. Last year the governments going along totaled 42 – five more than when the issue first rose in 1951 and but six short of the peak strength of 1957. But in proportional terms, support for the moratorium which began at 60 percent and rose to 73 percent in 1953, slipped back to the original level of 60 percent in 1956, to 58 percent in 1957 and 54 percent in the next two years. Last year it sagged to 43 percent – and the moratorium was saved only by the abstention of a large number of governments, mostly African, newly admitted to the Assembly. These new members, mostly fledgling governments, largely share a preoccupation with what they see as anti-imperialist causes, unconcern with problems left over from the Korean War, coolness or even antipathy to defense of the Taiwan position, and attitudes on Cold War issues ranging from shyness to anti-Western zeal.

This quickening trend has given the moratorium the look of a spent instrument. A complicating factor this year, moreover, is likely to rise from the linkage drawn by the Soviet Union between the admission of Mauretania and the admission of Outer Mongolia to the UN. The Russians have sponsored and the Nationalist Chinese have blocked the latter. In retaliation the Russians vetoed the admission of the former. This has strengthened opposition among Africans to the Taiwan regime for having, in their view, induced the frustration of Mauretania. A repetition of the exercise in double blocking this year seems bound to intensify an urge to replace Taiwan with Peking.

If all these factors converge in a decision to open the Assembly doors to Peking and thus to shut them to Taipeh, the outcome will amount to an unequivocal reversal for the United States. And it is one for which the public is poorly prepared. It is futile to hope to exempt the prestige of the US from damage in such an event. No government has options regarding involvement of its prestige – a matter invariably for others to decide. Such an outcome would be the first occasion for dramatizing the altered character of the Assembly on a controversy of emotional concern to the United States (as illustrated by repeated Congressional declarations) and which is directly related to security considerations. Fringe appeals to "Get the US out of the UN" and "Get the UN out of the US" will find new adherents. It could be to American public opinion what Suez was to the British.

Obviously the member governments of the UN have the right to settle issues within UN competence in whatever way a prescribed majority may decide. Obviously, also, one government's vote carries the same weight as another's in the Assembly. Yet the China issue has a special meaning for this country. It is US influence which the Peking regime is foresworn to eliminate from Asia. It is preponderantly a US command which, under the UN emblem, faces north at the Korean armistice line. It is the US which has accepted the obligation to defend Taiwan. It is the US into whose domain the spokesmen for Communist China would come if Peking were to elect to accept a proffer of the Chinese franchise in the UN. And it is the US alone which pays so large a portion of UN costs that a withholding of its single contribution would drastically impair the operational vitality of the organization.

As legal arguments these considerations count for little, but there is probably no way of keeping them from being taken into account in the public's reappraisal of relations with the UN. These are points to be met rather than elided by advocates of continued and undiminished identification of United States foreign policy with the United Nations.

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Mr. Walter's Squeeze Play

Almost unnoticed in the lame finish of the 87th Congress' first session, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and Rep. Francis E. Walter have staged one of the great, ironic coups of the session. They have forced House and Senate passage, in a form the President will find most awkward to sign, of a bill so hostile to accepted notions of civil liberties that in three previous attempts Walter could not get Senate approval for it.

As chairman of the House Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee, Walter has been pressing since 1956 for a sweeping retraction of due process for unwanted aliens in their efforts to stay deportation in the courts. His bill would accomplish this through the simple, if incredible, requirement that an alien notified that he is about to be put on a plane for, say, Afghanistan could not appeal to the nearest United States District Court, but has to petition a US Circuit Court of Appeals for judicial review, if any. There are 95 District Courts and only 11 Appeals Courts, so the logistics of appeal become as follows: an alien in Hawaii or Alaska would have to seek relief in San Francisco, the nearest Appeals Court; an alien in Texas would be relegated to New Orleans, and an alien in Puerto Rico would be discouraged from filing a "frivolous appeal" by the fact that his Appeals Court is in Boston.

Beyond that, the alien's appeal must be "timely," filed within six months. In the event that the Immigration and Naturalization Service could not find a country willing to take a foreign intruder (which happens not infrequently), the alien might assume that an expensive petition to the Court of Appeals was unnecessary. Then, six months and a day later, if shopping by Immigration agents finally found a country willing to accept the hapless alien, he would have no right of appeal, having failed to be "timely."

The purpose of these inequities is to drive away the cloud of humiliation and judicial defeat hanging over the Immigration Service in such celebrated cases as those of Carlos Marcello and Frank Costello. By stacking talented and expensive lawyers against government attorneys inexperienced in immigration procedures, Marcello and Costello had won stay after stay. Government attorneys were made to "look silly."

But as the American Bar Association has said in disputing the claim that such "abuse" justifies Walter's vindictive measure, "less than two percent" of the 15,000 aliens considered annually for deportation or exclusion seek relief in the courts, and of these the cases of "87 percent are settled without a trial." The contention that the present system permits unnecessary and dilatory litigation on a huge scale is simply not true. Indeed, ABA witnesses have told Walter his "reforms" will compound the jam in the courts.

Virtually every major legal, religious, welfare and refugee agency opposed Walter's bill. The sole supporting witnesses, besides the Justice Department, have been the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Daughters of the American Revolution and the Coalition of Patriotic Societies, a list that to many speaks for itself.

This year, although he got the House to approve the judicial review bill for a third time, Walter had again been thwarted in the Senate. But at the same time the Senate presented him with an extraordinary opportu-

Fable for Our Times: The Man Who Had an Acre

There was a man who had an acre. This was enough for him to live on, but not enough to make him secure. So he acquired the acre to the left of his acre, the one to the right, the one behind, and the one across the street.

Now his first acre was protected, but he had four others that needed protection. So he acquired eight more, and then another twelve for their protection. . . .

By the time he had expanded his holdings to include half Germany and half Korea he was more insecure than before. When he saw that his neighbors were still just as close to his frontiers he said it made him feel as if he had a bone in his throat. Their preparations to resist the further expansion of his holdings (which was now essential to his security as never before) seemed to him provocative. So he told them that if, when he pushed them, they pushed back, he in turn would push them back – and then the whole world would see for itself who'd started the pushing back.

His neighbors told everyone there would be no war because, in the Nuclear Age, pushing had become an obsolete means of gaining one's ends. He also told everyone there would be no war, but the reason he gave was that what had become obsolete in the Nuclear Age was pushing back.

So he pushed them, because he felt sure that was not obsolete, and they pushed back because it seemed the best thing to do, and just at this point the story ends. Clovis

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nity for parliamentary maneuver.

It was necessary this year to extend for another two years the Alien Orphan Adoption Act, under which thousands of Americans have adopted nearly 10,000 homeless children from abroad. When the Senate duly sent such a bill to the House – S 2237 – Walter's subcommittee seized it, stripped it and strapped the otherwise-unpassable judicial review bill on the orphans' backs. Still called S 2237, although unrecognizable as passed by the Senate, it cleared the House September 6. This meant that the new S 2237 went directly to a Senate-House conference committee. The conferees, predictably, approved the judicial review section. Walter's nearly finished work went back to the Senate and House for final action as a conference report, take it or leave it. They took it.

What is so clever about this maneuver is that Walter sweetened the bill by including a few long-sought amendments to other immigration statutes. One would make the orphan program permanent. Others would make revisions in the basic law – the McCarran Walter Act – of benefit to families separated by the exclusion of near relatives. But as Walter said on the House floor, "Except for the adopted orphans, this bill does not provide for the admission of one more person than would ultimately be admissible." There is no change in the miserly quota system.

In all this, Attorney General Kennedy, Deputy Attorney General Byron White, who specifically supported the substance of the judicial review section, and Immigration Commissioner Joseph M. Swing, who lobbied strenuously for it, supported Walter. So the President, whose remarkably well-kept campaign promises include a high priority one to the foreign born to the effect that "the protections provided by due process, right of appeal and the statute of limitations, can be extended to non-citizens without hampering the security of our nation," confronts a choice not of his, but in part of Brother Bobby's making: whether to renounce himself on the protection of the alien minority by the courts, or whether to renounce orphans.

It is a monstrous choice, and one offering no alternatives. He must sign. The result will be remembered in history as the first immigration reform of the Kennedy Administration.

Bellwethers and the Flock

On October 1, steel workers get a wage increase under the contract signed at the conclusion of last year's strike; the question is, to what extent will the steel companies pass the additional cost on to consumers, as they did in the postwar period prior to 1958? Publication of the President's exchange of letters with management and union executives in steel show how determined Kennedy is to keep bellwether industries from starting an upward creep in the price level.

The Council of Economic Advisers points to the industry's recently proved ability to operate at a profit, even when using its capacity at a rate which for many weeks during the recession was not greatly in excess of 50 percent, and which will probably average around 65 percent for the year. Since the expectation is that steel will be running early next year at close to an optimum rate as far as profits are concerned – somewhere around 80 percent and perhaps higher – its capacity to absorb these wage costs is evident.

In industry circles, no price increase is expected on October 1, and no across-the-board increase later; some types of steel are actually being sold in markets soft enough to undercut current quotations. Increases later on are expected, but thought to be too selective to attract government action. For their part, the companies ask whether the Administration will be equally forceful in holding the line against inflation next spring when negotiations on a new contract will start, and when the union will have its first opportunity in some time to bargain in an atmosphere of back-logged orders and high economic activity. They also express concern over the effect on investment and economic growth of holding down profits in what has historically been a relatively low-profit industry.

While thus looking ahead, all parties are also glancing sidelong at the new contracts in the automobile industry. The Auto Workers and the Steel Workers have long been rivals in the climb up the industrial union pay ladder – and while it is too soon to estimate accurately the cost of the new scales to the automobile industry, first impressions suggest the settlements have been more generous than had been anticipated in a year when wages generally were expected to rise only by narrow margins.

So much for the bellwethers. How fares the flock? August employment and unemployment figures are not cheery. The rate of unemployment (seasonally-adjusted) hangs just about where it has hung ever since last December, at 6.9 percent of the labor force. This means that 4.5 million people are looking for work and not finding it – about three quarters of a million more than a year ago. Another 1.9 million people are working part-time because they can't find full-time jobs – more than a quarter of a million more than in the June-August period of the past three years.

At the same time, employment figures are high – 68.5 million at work in August, a record high and about 300,000 over a year ago.

Among workers on non-farm payrolls, employment was 80,000 higher than last year: the new jobs are in the occupations that have been going up for some time – government at all levels (up about 300,000) and finance, services and construction (up about 125,000).

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Manufacturing, which partly because of automation and partly because of absence of demand, has been getting thinner as services have swelled, was down nearly 200,000 over the year – only five such industries employed more people this year than in 1960.

These are curious figures to record at a time when "super-boom" is in the daily headlines and the business press, and when the bellwether industries are being nipped by White House sheepdogs to get back into line. Yet no one doubts that as the impact of various recently-activated government programs moves into the production stage, and as the time shortens until the federal budget reaches the $100 billion level which Mr. Walter Heller of the Council of Economic Advisers projected on a recent television show as being not far ahead, the control of inflation will again be the issue that gets the spotlight.

Senatorial Indiscretion

The Senate has suffered a relapse of judgment in resurrecting the Dullesian doctrine of client states. An amendment accepted by the Senate in its consideration of the Foreign Aid Appropriation bill would require our government's taking into consideration the attitude of recipient states on issues of international policy in deciding how to apportion United States assistance.

This was a comprehensible action coming in the wake of the Belgrade Conference of the non-aligned nations, and of the President's piqued observation, in signing the aid authorization bill, that "in the administration of these funds we should give great attention and consideration to those nations who have our view of the world crisis." But it was nonetheless self-defeating. One can scarcely doubt that the provision reflects public annoyance at the idea of helping those who do not seem always to be helping the US; yet a question of prudence remains.

An Asian statesman well disposed to this country and deeply understanding of the great issues put the matter this way in a personal conversation: "Why do Americans tend always to think there ought to be a law? Can nothing of this sort be left to implicit judgment? No one should reasonably question your right to administer your aid in a way to fit your interests as you see them; yet to make this idea explicit in the law only subjects every needy government that is inclined to support you on some issue to the charge that it is trying to curry favor in hope of getting aid. The recipients of your aid will be placed under pressure to oppose you mainly to show that their independence has not been impaired. The Senate's purpose is understandable. But the provision is likely to produce a result just opposite to the one intended."

Guerrilla Warfare

A postscript to Denis Warner's article on Laos is called for by Army Secretary Elvis J. Stahr, Jr.'s reference recently in a speech to the American Legion to the doubling in size of the Army's special forces trained for counter-guerrilla warfare. It was known before the Secretary spoke that American-trained guerrillas have taken the initiative and are now using what is known as the Vietminh trail through Laos into North Vietnam to carry the war to the Communists. This new tactic is based on the Kennedy Administration's assumption that though nuclear deterrents and conventional armies are essential, the military challenge posed by Communist penetration in the underdeveloped world is primarily of the guerrilla type. The assumption is broadly correct – with qualifications.

South Vietnam has become a big and bloody guerrilla battlefield, and President Ngo Dinh Diem's position is thereby threatened. If all of North Vietnam were to become a big and bloody guerrilla battlefield, President Ho Chi Minh's position would likewise be threatened. But at this point a caution enters: to assume that the introduction of hastily trained South Vietnamese guerrillas into North Vietnam will throw the Vietminh off balance and onto the defensive is to misunderstand the nature of the battle. It may pump some temporary spirit into the Vietnamese Army: but the most probable result is that Diem's regime will become as unpopular in the rural North as it is in the rural South.

What is happening in South Vietnam is not the haphazard invasion of Diem's rural provinces by North Vietnamese guerrillas: Communists do not fight guerrilla wars this way. Long before they think of firing the first shot they plant their cells and organize their fronts. Though they do not balk at murder (the elimination of unpopular and dictatorial officials is an effective form of "agitprop"), in essence their activities are directed toward cultivating the conditions under which a popular uprising is possible. They do not use Northerners against Southerners but Southerners against Southerners, so that the struggle takes the form and character of a "war of national liberation."

It is established beyond reasonable doubt that the direction, coordination and equipment of the pro-Communist Viet Cong guerrillas in South Vietnam come from Hanoi in the North; there is evidence too that Southerners have been taken North for training and then sent back to their own areas to whip up revolt. But the essential difference between the pro-Communist guerrillas fighting in South Vietnam and the anti-Communist guerrillas being sent from the South to fight in North Vietnam is that the peasants identify the former as local people dependent on local support (sometimes given under duress, sometimes voluntarily), while the latter are interlopers. To succeed in these

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regions, a guerrilla revolt must give the appearance of being an indigenous product. And to give this fiction the appearance of fact in South Vietnam has taken the Communists years of careful preparation.

Now, with an internal revolt in full swing, they can justify external assistance in the form of arms and supplies without badly compromising themselves in the eyes of the people on whom they depend. Search as one may in South Vietnam for evidence to the contrary, there is nothing to suggest that Northern forces (as against Southerners trained in the North) have been engaged. There may be – and probably are – some Northern Vietminh cadres, but there is no proof of this.

This is not surprising to those who have studied the Indo-China wars over the past 12 years. The Chinese could have swamped the French in 1949 by a direct, overt invasion: instead they took Ho Chi Minh's guerrillas into China, trained them, equipped them and sent them back to exploit their already carefully prepared political bases. The opportunity certainly exists in North Vietnam to set the countryside alight with revolution. The inspiration, the guidance, the direction and the means of carrying on the revolt may all come from the South: but unless the uprising is, in fact, an uprising and not merely an importation of Southern guerrillas trained largely by experts imported from abroad, it has little hope of success.

Galbraith in Hand

The future of socialism in Canada, for 30 years a major dissenting force in the nation's political life, but so far never a decision-making one because it has never held federal power, was the main topic in Ottawa recently of Canada's largest political convention. "The Founding Convention" of the "New Party" was a bold attempt to wed the very old and the very new hues of Canadian socialism into a structure whose strength would win Canada's next federal election, and possibly make over the country into a Swedish-style social democracy. The stand-in title "New Party" was accepted two years ago, originally as temporary terminology to replace the cumbersome "Cooperative Commonwealth Federation" (CCF for short), which Canada's Socialist Party had carried since the 1940's. The old CCF always had more ideas than votes, and at present it holds only a meager eight seats in Canada's 265-seat House of Commons.

If this "New Party" ever comes to power, it will bring about in Canada the wide implementation as firm public policy of J.K. Galbraith's views on social purpose and international economic aid. Long before their convention, the "New Party's" young intellectuals had firmly established Galbraithian bases for it and outlined these at length in their major study, *Social Purpose for Canada*. This injection of new blood has been salutary. Clutching their paperback copies of *The Affluent Society*, moving in their new numbers into the convention hall, "New Party" club members' pleas for tempered social change were far removed from the nostalgic appeals of the lingering doctrinaires who signed an all-out manifesto in 1932 in the depression-struck wheat province of Saskatchewan for total nationalization of the Canadian economy.

Yet, the broadening of the base of Canadian socialism from its narrowly agrarian roots may have come too late. The old CCF had long since become the dried-out milch cow which had supplied almost all of the programs for social security that the two major political parties of Canada able to muster enough votes to win power had translated into law.

Between 1935 and 1957, a long-lived liberal regime instituted and perfected the CCF-inspired old age pension and unemployment insurance. The same liberals initiated numerous state companies when private industry in Canada was still too under-capitalized to begin them. In 1957 they were swept out of power by the present Conservative Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker who has spent a record $1.2 billion in extended social services, is himself a native of Saskatchewan where a provincial socialist regime has held unbroken power since 1944, and who was once called "agrarian radical" by a political opponent. All this is in the best tradition of selective theft by discerning moderates of the welfare proposals of "radicals," carried out elsewhere by Mr. Macmillan in Britain and by FDR in the United States.

Somewhat strange to the US union movement is the influential role in the Canadian left played by the Canadian subsidiaries of the larger US industrial unions, chiefly the United Auto Workers and the United Steelworkers. While no officials of these unions or of any others affiliated with the one million member Canadian Labor Congress (Canada's equivalent of the AFL-CIO) will be allowed to seek openly "New Party" candidacies, the contributions of Canadian trade unions to the "Founding Convention" suggests a strong future interest. There were 240 delegates from the USW among the "New Party's" 1,700 convention delegates.

NEXT WEEK: *What terms may the West accept in negotiating a new Berlin settlement?*

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The Meaning of Belgrade

by Walter Z. Laqueur and Alfred Sherman

For the many Western well wishers of the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia, the meeting of the "non-aligned" in Belgrade came as a shock and their mortification has freely been voiced in Europe as well as in the US Senate.

What Western observers were offered by way of political diagnosis could not fail to irritate them. There was the amiable Mr. Sukarno declaring that, "We have the bound duty to tell people in other countries quite frankly that they cannot go on living at the expense of millions of poverty stricken people. Their affluent societies are built upon the sweat and toil and tears of millions who spend their evenings not with their eyes glued to their television sets, but in a darkness pierced by the light of a single candle. . . . Their days are tormented not by the desire to have a better motor car than their neighbors but by their desire to give their children a meager bowl of rice a day. . . . We must tell them in the West that their rising living standards must be the result of their hard work." It was a moving picture, thought Mr. Sukarno, who couples a great belief in ostentatious spending on his frequent tours of the world's capitals with an apparent lack of interest in Indonesian domestic affairs. Hashem Jawad, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, argued that Western imperialism was the main obstacle in the way to peace and peaceful coexistence: "The talk about collective security against what is called Communist conspiracy to dominate the world is nothing but a mere fraud." President Modibo Kieta of Mali, who subsequently and in the company of Mr. Sukarno brought the message of Belgrade to President Kennedy, argued that the population of East Germany had freely opted for socialism and who could possibly compel them to change their opinion?

Such utterances coupled with a general willingness to find extenuating circumstances for Mr. Khrushchev's decision to renew atomic tests not unnaturally provoked Western observers. Peregrine Worsthorne of the London *Daily Telegraph* concluded that "the more [the West] seeks to align its policies with the neutral nations the more it seeks to woo them, the more they will be compelled to move eastward, so as to avoid the unwanted embrace. . . . The truth is that if they are to retain their position in the middle they cannot afford to lag too far behind Soviet intransigence or to be overtaken too completely by Western moderation." Such an appraisal seemed uncomfortably close to realities. And yet, an attempt should be made to understand the underlying reasons for these attitudes.

With certain exceptions, the non-aligned nations and the overwhelming majority of their populations see the world as divided into three: the Western bloc, the Soviet bloc, and themselves. They feel that they owe no loyalty to either of the two blocs but regard them as realities which pre-existed them, and with which they have no alternative but to coexist as best they can. The fact that some live under a political system broadly similar to Western democracy while others are developing societies which have many features in common with Communist states does not significantly influence their loyalties; Nehru, Nasser, Nkrumah and U Nu feel much closer to each other than any one of them does to Britain, the Soviet Union or China.

The two partial exceptions to this rule are Yugoslavia and Cuba. Tito's stand at the conference, which was the most obdurately anti-Western on all questions, should serve as a reminder that Yugoslavia is a Communist state, whose rulers explicitly consider it a member of the Communist world though not of the Sino-Soviet bloc as at present constituted and who still aspire to be accepted by it as an equal partner. They share the Communist world view on a whole range of theoretical and practical questions, together with a high degree of loyalty and emotional identification, while remaining determined to preserve their own sovereignty undiminished. The Cuban performance lent further weight to the belief that for all practical purposes the country's leaders at present are wholly identified with the Communist bloc and that their adherence to the flexible principle of non-alignment is a matter of temporary expediency.

The conference provided a revealing picture of the climate of opinion, sense of priorities, and limits of agreement among the non-aligned nations. Though world peace came first on the agenda, the dominant theme was the evil of Western colonialism. As one member of an African delegation remarked, though many participants agreed intellectually with Premier Nehru when he stressed that the era of classic colonialism is dead and that though there are remaining patches to be cleared up, this struggle must not be allowed to obscure broader issues, few accepted his admonitions emotionally. The further the discussion moved from

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colonial questions, the smaller the consensus – but also the weaker the divisive effect of disagreements since the conference did not make binding decisions.

This does not mean that the conference merely collected and reproduced grievances. On the contrary, it was instructive to observe the way in which the large number of proposed issues canvassed for support were received. Sympathy was unanimously accorded to territories where a struggle against Western rule was in progress: Algeria, Angola, Bizerte, and South Africa. The final declaration, however, omitted Morocco's claim for Mauretania, Afghan claims on what is at present Pakistani Territory, Iraqi claims to Kuwait, and Indonesia's claim to Dutch New Guinea (West Irian) among others. It also omitted the Arab proposal to condemn Israel as an imperialist tool and to declare all Palestine Arab territory by right, calling instead for respect for the UN Charter and UN resolutions recognizing the State of Israel and its duties towards Arab refugees alike.

What grievances were aired, however, were almost wholly against the West, and this is understandable. Africa has never experienced Soviet rule, or much in the way of Soviet pressure. Those few Asian states under serious Soviet or Chinese pressure are aligned with the West in defense pacts, and therefore were absent from the conference. The people of Soviet Asia have been too quiescent to evoke real feeling on this question among the Afro-Asians, whose views had obviously been formed by escorted trips. Grievances at the West, on the other hand, are still deeply embedded, though it was noticeable that by and large those states which received their independence during the 1940's were considerably mellower than the regimes of the 1950's. India, Burma, Nepal, Ceylon, Ethiopia were generally well to one side, with Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Algeria, Morocco on the other wing together with Cuba and Yugoslavia.

Less Than Full Agreement

On broader questions of international relations, opinions ranged all the way from close support for the Soviet stand to a fair measure of agreement with Western policies. Criticism of Western policies on general issues as well as colonial questions was uninhibited in the speeches of those states which are "non-aligned against the West," whereas what little criticism of Soviet policies was made at all by "moderates" was so circumspect and hedged with qualifications that it often sounded more like justification than criticism.

All Western observers could find to console them was the conference's rejection of a pro-Soviet stand on a number of major issues. Pressure from Tito, Nkrumah and others for reorganization of the UN Secretariat along lines broadly similar to Soviet proposals was defeated, thanks partly to a statesmanlike evaluation of the United Nation's role in the Congo by Premier Cyrille Adoula. Pressure from the same and other quarters for a declaration calling for the recognition of the division of Germany into two sovereign states "as a fact of life" was also defeated.

Yet the main lesson to be learned from the Conference is that the attitudes of the non-aligned which seem to work in the Soviet favor are liable to prevail for some time, and may well gain further support in the underdeveloped continents. This does not imply that Western policies have to be either passive or defeatist, that breast-beating for past sins will help, or that the West should give up the non-aligned countries as hopeless – far from it. It means that Western policies will have to set out from an awareness that because of their unique experience and problems, the non-aligned see things in a different light, and that only their own individual or collective experience can fundamentally change their views. Attempts to cajole these states, or railing against what appears to be hypocrisy, are bound to be self-defeating.

If the West urgently needs to come to terms with non-alignment, however, the non-aligned countries themselves must examine its implications more critically. Mr. Nehru warned the conference to correctly "evaluate both our actual and potential strength and lack of strength; both have to be considered together." As Nehru pointed out, the Belgrade powers' lack of strength is exemplified by the fact that they can neither reach agreement on specific solutions for world problems, nor impose any ideas they may have.

Until now most states represented at Belgrade, and others like them, have come to identify the gradual shift in the balance of world power against the West with the rise in their own fortunes. The effect of the policies of these states has, on the whole, been to tilt the balance still further against the West, intentionally or otherwise. (Sometimes Western policies have appeared to leave them little alternative.) But unless they come to recognize that they too are dependent on the balance of power for immunity from the Communist drive for world hegemony, they may find themselves sawing off the branch on which they sit. This is gradually being realized in some Asian and African capitals, but it is a slow process.

The West need not put all its trust in an increasing sophistication among neutral statesmen, for there are certain objective trends that are contributing to this education. The borders between the blocs in Europe are frozen; the Communist parties have steadily decreased in influence over the last decade and any Communist advance is now possible only by non-peaceful means, which in Europe would soon bring about a third world war. The only exception is, of course, Berlin, but this crisis, however dangerous, will not last forever. Once a

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solution, however tenuous, has been found for Berlin, it seems almost a foregone conclusion that the next crisis will erupt in Asia or Africa, where a generally unsettled state of affairs offers the Communists greater revolutionary opportunities and much more freedom of maneuver. It is another foregone conclusion that the Communist attitude toward the *national bourgeoisie* in Asia and Africa is changing. According to recent Communist statements of policy, it is no longer enough to be "national bourgeois" and vaguely progressive; a higher stage, much closer to Communism ("National Democracy") should be reached soon by the nonaligned countries, unless, like Cuba, they have entered it already. Unfortunately for the Communists, neither Nehru nor Nasser, neither U Nu nor Sukarno show any inclination to retire from the scene because they will soon have outlived (in Communist eyes) their usefulness; on the contrary they (or their successors) will fight for their political survival. Therefore, it is highly likely that the neutrals rather than the West may directly clash with the Communist bloc in the years ahead. The Soviet leaders would of course prefer to postpone this conflict, but prodded by the Chinese, who are much less worried by the prospect of breaking with the neutrals, and compelled by the momentum of their militant ideology, there is little they can do to prevent a clash. The best they can hope for is a split among the neutrals.

Quite a few observers returned from Belgrade convinced that Western policies should not be much influenced in future by any hope of winning the uncommitted world to its side. This should have been obvious for a long time, and the neutrals cannot be accused of having misled the West about their intentions. But bitterness that is the child of our illusions should not lead us to reject a Western policy of masterful inactivity *vis-à-vis* the neutral world, and an equal measure of patience and firmness.

If Laos Is Lost, What Next?

by Denis Warner

Ironically, the Kingdom of Laos, in which overt and identifiable Communist Chinese activity has been minimal, is responsible for a widespread reappraisal of prospects and policies that is taking place in Southeast Asia. Both Indonesia's neutralist foreign minister and the anti-Communist Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines have said the same thing, in the same words: "Laos is lost." Lost by the West, rather than won by the Communists. Years of Western effort, the creation of the Laotian Army, the expenditure of more than $300 million on aid and the establishment of SEATO to provide the final safeguard – all were in vain. Even Prince Sihanouk, Cambodia's ex-king and now ex-head of state, who set the Geneva conference on Laos in train, realizes now that his efforts have only hastened what he hoped to prevent. "Laos," he wrote in a recent article in the *Phom Penh Realities*, "is about to become a natural and inevitable extension of the Communist bloc."

The debacle is all the more serious because the major Communist powers contributed so little to it. The Chinese did little more than make encouraging sounds: the Russians did not enter the field competitively until last December. The West had six years' start and still could not win. If it could not insure the success of its policies here when China was not even in the ring, what are its chances of saving any part of Southeast Asia when China overcomes its temporary difficulties (drought, flood, rural mismanagement and resultant food shortages) and devotes itself seriously to the elimination of the last vestiges of Western influence on its peripheries? It is a question that Southeast Asians have a right to ask. And it should not occasion any surprise if the answers are not favorable to us. Everyone with any pretensions to knowledge about this unhappy kingdom is aware that there were all sorts of evils, including graft and corruption and exchange manipulations. The Royal Laotian Army was a comic tragedy and the CIA was hoist by its own petard when it engineered the Boun Oum-Phoumi counter-revolution against the Souvanna Phouma-Kong Le group. Everyone knows also that the British and French balked at the prospect of SEATO military action at the Council meeting in Bangkok last March. And apart from the Filipinos and the Thais and some Americans and Aus-

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tralians, the consensus is that they were right, that morally it was indefensible to revert to armed force because of political, economic and ideological failures, and that, in any event, military action would have escalated into Korean-type war in which, whatever else happened, the Laotians would have been the principal losers.

It is not the application of Western policy that is now being called into account but the policy itself. The West is being accused of tilting at windmills. SEATO was the natural child of Dien Bien Phu and the Dulles-Radford view that the ghastly blunders of the Indo-China war, with all its colonial overtones, could have been redeemed by massive, last minute intervention, and that militant Communism was marching south in Asia and something had to be created and thrown in its path. With the United States footing the bill, conventional regional armies in Southeast Asia expanded like balloons – and in Laos, were just as easily pricked. SEATO planners spent thousands of man hours on detailed schemes for spreading Mr. Dulles' "mantle of protection." No one can know for sure, of course, whether SEATO did or did not deter overt aggression. It may have been that without it the Communists would have marched south, literally: and for many reasons its disbandment now would clearly be unwise. Since the US 7th Fleet has been the only truly significant deterrent force in the area, it is doubtful, however, whether SEATO, as such, ever seriously worried the Communists. In any event, they quickly found ways of circumventing it, busying themselves with the preparation of the political bases which have led to the defeat of Western policies in Laos and to a situation in South Vietnam which is much closer to the climax than many in Saigon, and apparently in Washington, care to concede. Even now, with the lessons of China itself, of the Indo-China War and of Laos to draw on, the conclusions being reached by the West, though radically different from those arrived at by many Southeast Asians, are no less a cause for disquiet.

Revolution and Counter-Revolution

Today the appreciation is that the threat is not conventional but guerrilla, and that since the Communists are fighting guerrilla wars, widespread guerrilla bands are the answer. The basic weakness of Appreciation 1961, however, like that of Appreciation 1954, is the failure to recognize that Communist armed struggle (in anything but major war) is merely the final expression of activities which are non-military, an outcropping of political, social and economic seeds planted in fertile political ground. This is true whether the war takes conventional or guerrilla form, since the first, as Mao has laid down, is merely the extension of the second.

This is the real secret to Communist success in promoting wars of national liberation. Until it is thoroughly understood, all of the military efforts of the United States in countries such as South Vietnam and Laos are likely to be in vain.

Guerrillas that are sprouts of improving rural conditions would certainly be an answer to the Communists: but then improving rural conditions would in themselves be an answer. Guerrillas without local roots and operating in an uncooperative countryside are almost certain to have a barren result. In the long run, the harm they cause politically is likely to outweigh any initial military victories they may win. Mao lays down that a "national revolution can succeed only with universal and thoroughgoing political mobilization." The requisites for effective counter-revolution are similar.

Lacking the indigenous resources to provide the necessary rural welfare and well-being, the Burmese and the Cambodians hope they can persuade the Communists to lay off. They pin their faith to the belief that Peking cannot afford to risk its reputation in the underdeveloped world by making its fellow-subscribers to the five principles of peaceful coexistence a target for subversive techniques. And the rewards for such cooperation, as both Burma and Cambodia have discovered, *are* often worthwhile. All Communist countries today are pursuing a deliberate policy of buying more and more of the produce of the underdeveloped world. The bloc combined to buy Cuba's sugar (at a cent a pound above the ruling world market price) when its sales to the United States were cut off. And this is only one example. In 1958, for example, the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries bought only 28,000 tons of coffee. By 1965, according to a United Nations survey, this will have increased to 138,000 tons. Imports of cocoa beans, rubber, cotton, citrus fruits and a host of other products of the underdeveloped world show a similar trend.

It is understood, of course, that there are dangers both in depending on Communist countries for trade and in placing faith in peaceful coexistence. India, especially, learned of the dangers in the latter, but the lesson is familiar to both U Nu and Sihanouk, and also to Sukarno and the neutralists of Singapore, Saigon and elsewhere. Still, as they see the situation, there is no alternative. Countries with anti-Communist policies are the primary targets for the Communists' subversive techniques to which neither the West nor the countries under attack have yet found the deterrent. To the argument that by "going along," they are merely postponing the evil day, Sihanouk of Cambodia replies that every day won is a victory. Other Southeast Asians, especially among the students and intelligentsia, are open and enthusiastic supporters of the Communists' "zone

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of peace" and "warless areas" concept. This is true of every country in the region, including South Vietnam, where frustration with the constant state of war is mounting.

Now, there is nothing wrong with neutrality; it is no longer considered "immoral"; but it requires either a depth of political sophistication (*e.g.* Sweden), or the means and the will for self-defense (*e.g.* India), both of which are lacking in the smaller Southeast Asian states and in most other parts of the underdeveloped world. If Peking succeeds in its efforts to create its "zone of peace" here, Southeast Asia will merely be added to the larder in China's deep freeze. The manner and the timing of its consumption will await Peking's pleasure. The United States will lose its foothold on the South Asian mainland and Peking will be an appreciable step closer to its stated goal: the exclusion of the US from the West Pacific. It is not wildly pessimistic to suggest that Peking's chances of achieving its aim are bright.

The loss might not disturb the balance of world power too much, though Southeast Asia with a population of 200 million plus is also one of the world's biggest markets and source of raw materials. The point that cannot be hammered home too often, however, is that Communist tactics in Southeast Asia are the standard technique now in use in all underdeveloped regions, including Africa and Latin America. If the answers are not found in Southeast Asia, they are unlikely to be found elsewhere.

To state that the answers will not be found within the framework of either current aid programs or military deterrents is not to suggest that these are no longer necessary. Both provide a rich field for criticism, but I am not arguing for their abolition, only saying that unfortunately, neither gets to the heart of the problem. The underdeveloped world is a rural slum and conditions in the most depressed areas have failed to improve primarily because the prices for the raw materials they produce have fallen in recent years while the materials manufactured from them have been rising. The underdeveloped world's trade deficit between 1950 and 1959 ran to more than $15 billion; in 1958 alone it was $3.5 billion. Exports have gone up, but prices have gone down. The West buys more and more and pays less and less and sells more and more at higher and higher prices. The deficit is met only by huge injections of Western, principally US, aid. In short, one unsalubrious effect of the aid programs has been to subsidize raw material exploitation.

Australia's Deputy Prime Minister, John McEwen, has estimated that if the value of the bulk commodities of the underdeveloped countries could be increased by only 10 percent they would be able to earn the extra $1.5 billion which has been needed on the average in the past 10 years to wipe off their trade deficits. Much more importantly than this, such an increase would bring material gain to the rural areas of the underdeveloped countries. It would have an impact far beyond the towns and cities. It would get to the grass roots of the rural societies, where rising standards of living would begin to erect their own barriers against Communist subversion.

"The free world," says Mr. McEwen, "must find the means of overcoming the present paradoxical situation where some of its members are starving, or have available less than they really need of foodstuffs and other essential commodities, while other members have surpluses, which they must either give away or sell at less than the cost of production. The prosperity of some is being threatened by having too much and of others by having too little. Unless this flaw in the structure of the free world can be mended, its days as an effective trading community must be numbered." He might have gone further: unless it can be mended, in time we shall be ousted from every nook and cranny of the underdeveloped world.

An End to Boom and Bust

Here, then, is the first requirement: a guaranteed minimum price (geared to the price of resulting manufactured goods) for the commodities of the underdeveloped world and an end to boom and bust fluctuations that have characterized the price of tin and rubber, to name only two commodities especially important to Southeast Asia. As Mr. McEwen sees it, this means in the first instance higher prices for raw materials. It also means a reappraisal of internal policies within Western countries, a willingness to produce less of these products themselves than their systems of restrictions and of subsidies, deficiency payments and the like in favor of their own producers are aimed at achieving.

I am not unwise enough to advance this as the complete answer to the Communist threat in the underdeveloped world. In some areas, such as South Vietnam, the situation has deteriorated close to the point of disaster. The Communists have completed their groundwork. The rural slum has been stirred up, activated and armed for revolt that will not be halted by any increase in the price of South Vietnam's exports. Military action calls for a military reaction, but the elimination of armed Communist forces will not by itself eliminate the reasons which made the revolt possible. Here, and in similar situations, war and welfare must go together. The peasants must not only be separated from the armed Communist forces by military action but compensated for their losses and brought within the framework of an administration that aims at, and has the means to insure, their betterment.

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"REVOLUTIONARY VIRUS"?

John Maynard Keynes, the urbane British economist, has been dead 15 years but his ghost still haunts the imagination of the radicals of the Right in this country. Thus, Sen. Barry Goldwater stirs up a crowd of 4,000 in San Antonio, Texas, by turning his fire on the Kennedy Administration's "Keynesian, cockeyed, left-wing, socialistic doctrines." And alumni of Harvard recently received in the mail a brochure from the "Veritas Foundation" which proposes to "unmask the methods by which the Keynesian revolutionary virus is being injected, by degrees, into the lifeblood of our free society." The brochure is entitled "Keynesianism-Marxism at Harvard" and puts forward the proposition that "the Keynesian crowd, in large measure, furnish support for the defense of those accused as Soviet spies and militantly uphold the right of Communists to practice their subversion. . . ." It contends that "Nazis, Fascists, Argentine Peronistas, followers of Nehru and those in the United States who yearn for a 'man on horseback' have embraced the socio-economic thinking of Keynes. Even Communists (who are supposed to be wedded only to Marx) have espoused the Keynesian dogma." As a contribution to enlightenment about Keynesianism the editors of The New Republic *here republish a few things that John Maynard Keynes had to say for himself.*

Keynes, According to Keynes

AN OBSOLETE TEXTBOOK

. . . Many, in this age without religion, are bound to feel a strong emotional curiosity toward any religion which is really new, and not merely a recrudescence of old ones, and has proved its motive force; and all the more when the new thing comes out of Russia, the beautiful, and foolish youngest son of the European family, with hair on his head, nearer both to the earth and to heaven than his bald brothers in the West – who, having been born two centuries later, has been able to pick up the middle-aged disillusionment of the rest of the family before he has lost the genius of youth or become addicted to comfort and to habits. I sympathize with those who seek for something good in Soviet Russia.

But when we come to the actual thing what is one to say? For me, brought up in a free air undarkened by the horrors of religion, with nothing to be afraid of, Red Russia holds too much which is detestable. Comfort and habits let us be ready to forego, but I am not ready for a creed which does not care how much it destroys the liberty and security of daily life, which uses deliberately the weapons of persecution, destruction and international strife. How can I admire a policy which finds a characteristic expression in spending millions to suborn spies in every family and group at home, and to stir up trouble abroad? Perhaps this is no worse and has more purpose than the greedy, warlike and imperialist propensities of other governments; but it must be far better than these to shift me out of my rut. How can I accept a doctrine which sets up as its bible, above and beyond criticism, an obsolete economic textbook which I know to be not only scientifically erroneous but without interest or application for the modern world? How can I adopt a creed which, preferring the mud to the fish, exalts the boorish proletariat above the bourgeois and the intelligentsia who, with whatever faults, are the quality in life and surely carry the seeds of all human advancement? Even if we need a religion, how can we find it in the turbid rubbish of the Red bookshops? It is hard for an educated, intelligent son of Western Europe to find his ideals here, unless he has first suffered some strange and horrid process of conversion which has changed all his values. . .

If Communism achieves a certain success, it will achieve it, not as an improved economic technique, but as a religion. The tendency of our conventional criticisms is to make two opposed mistakes. We hate Communism so much, regarded as a religion, that we exaggerate its economic inefficiency; and we are so much impressed by its economic inefficiency that we underestimate it as a religion.

On the economic side I cannot perceive that Russian Communism has made any contribution to our economic problems of intellectual interest or scientific value. I do not think that it contains, or is likely to contain, any piece of useful economic technique which we could not apply, if we chose, with equal or greater success in a society which retained all the marks, I will not say of

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19th Century individualistic capitalism, but of British bourgeois ideals. . . . But as a religion what are its forces? Perhaps they are considerable. The exaltation of the common man is dogma which has caught the multitude before now. Any religion and the bond which unites co-religionists have power against the egotistic atomism of the irreligious.

For modern capitalism is absolutely irreligious, without internal union, without much public spirit, often, though not always, a mere congeries of possessors and pursuers. Such a system has to be immensely, not merely moderately, successful to survive. In the 19th Century it was in a certain sense idealistic; at any rate it was a united and self-confident system. It was not only immensely successful, but held out hopes of a continuing crescendo of prospective successes. Today it is only moderately successful. If irreligious capitalism is ultimately to defeat religious Communism, it is not enough that it should be economically more efficient – it must be many times as efficient.

We used to believe that modern capitalism was capable, not merely of maintaining the existing standards of life, but of leading us gradually into an economic paradise where we should be comparatively free from economic cares. Now we doubt whether the businessman is leading us to a destination far better than our present place. Regarded as a means he is tolerable; regarded as an end he is not so satisfactory. One begins to wonder whether the material advantages of keeping business and religion in different compartments are sufficient to balance the moral disadvantages. The Protestant and Puritan could separate them comfortably because the first activity pertained to earth and the second to heaven, which was elsewhere. The believer in progress could separate them comfortably because he regarded the first as the means to the establishment of heaven upon earth hereafter. But there is a third state of mind, in which we do not fully believe either in a heaven which is elsewhere or in progress as a sure means toward a heaven upon earth hereafter; and if heaven is not elsewhere and not hereafter, it must be here and now or not at all. If there is no moral objective in economic progress, then it follows that we must not sacrifice, even for a day, moral to material advantage – in other words, that we may no longer keep business and religion in separate compartments of the soul. . . .

At any rate to me it seems clearer every day that the moral problem of our age is concerned with the love of money, with the habitual appeal to the money motive in nine-tenths of the activities of life, with the universal striving after individual economic security as the prime object of endeavor, with the social approbation of money as the measure of constructive success, and with the social appeal to the hoarding instinct as the foundation of the necessary provision for the family and for the future. The decaying religions around us, which have less and less interest for most people unless it be as an agreeable form of magical ceremonial or of social observance, have lost their moral significance just because – unlike some of their earlier versions – they do not touch in the least degree on these essential matters. A revolution in our ways of thinking and feeling about money may become the growing purpose of contemporary embodiments of the ideal. Perhaps, therefore, Russian Communism does represent the first confused stirrings of a great religion.

– The New Republic, October 28, November 11, 1925

THE AGENDA OF THE STATE

We cannot . . . settle on abstract grounds but must handle on its merits in detail, what Burke termed "one of the finest problems in legislation, namely, to determine what the State ought to take upon itself to direct by the public wisdom, and what it ought to leave, with as little interference as possible, to individual exertion." We have to discriminate between what Bentham, in his forgotten but useful nomenclature, used to term *Agenda* and *Non-Agenda*, and to do this without Bentham's prior presumption that interference is, at the same time, "generally needless" and "generally pernicious." Perhaps the chief task of economists at this hour is to distinguish afresh the *Agenda* of government from the *Non-Agenda;* and the companion task of politics is to devise forms of government within a democracy which shall be capable of accomplishing the *Agenda*. . . .

I criticize doctrinaire State Socialism, not because it seeks to engage men's altruistic impulses in the service of society, or because it departs from *laissez-faire*, or because it takes away from man's natural liberty to make a million, or because it has courage for bold experiments. All these things I applaud. I criticize it because it misses the significance of what is actually happening; because it is, in fact, little better than a dusty survival of a plan to meet the problems of 50 years ago, based on a misunderstanding of what someone said a hundred years ago. Nineteenth-century State Socialism sprang from Bentham, free competition, etc., and is in some respects a clearer, in some respects, a more muddled, version of just the same philosophy as underlies 19th Century individualism. Both equally laid all their stress on freedom, the one negatively to avoid limitations on existing freedom, the other positively to destroy natural or acquired monopolies. They are different reactions to the same intellectual atmosphere.

The most important *Agenda* of the State relates not to those activities which private individuals are already fulfilling, but to those functions which fall outside the sphere of the individual, to those decisions which are made by no one if the State does not make them. The

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important thing for government is not to do things which individuals are doing already, and to do them a little better or worse; but to do those things which at present are not done at all. . . .

I believe that some coordinated act of intelligent judgment is required as to the scale on which it is desirable that the community as a whole should save, the scale on which these savings should go abroad in the form of foreign investments, and whether the present organization of the investment market distributes savings along the most nationally productive channels. I do not think these matters should be left entirely to the chances of private judgment and private profits. . . .

– *The New Republic, September 1, 1926*

MAN'S PERMANENT PROBLEM

There is evidence that the revolutionary technical changes, which have so far chiefly affected industry, may soon be attacking agriculture. We may be on the eve of improvements in the efficiency of food production as great as those which have already taken place in mining, manufacture and transport. In quite a few years – in our own lifetimes I mean – we may be able to perform all the operations of agriculture, mining and manufacture with a quarter of the human effort to which we have been accustomed. For the moment the very rapidity of these changes is hurting us and bringing difficult problems to solve. . . .

We are being afflicted with a new disease of which some readers may not yet have heard the name, but of which they will hear a great deal in the years to come – namely, *technological unemployment*. This means unemployment due to our discovery of means of economizing the use of labor outrunning the pace at which we can find new uses for labor.

But this is only a temporary phase of maladjustment. All this means in the long run *that mankind is solving its economic problem*. I would predict that the standard of life in progressive countries 10 years hence will be between 4 and 8 times as high as it is today. . . .

To those who sweat for their daily bread leisure is a longed-for sweet – until they get it.

There is the traditional epitaph written for herself by the old charwoman:

Don't mourn for me, friends, don't weep for me never,
For I'm going to do nothing for ever and ever.

This was her heaven. Like others who look forward to leisure, she conceived how nice it would be to spend her time listening-in – for there was another couplet which occurred in her poem:

With psalms and sweet music the heavens'll be ringing,
But I shall have nothing to do with the singing.

Yet it will only be for those who have to do with the singing that life will be tolerable – and how few of us can sing!

Thus for the first time since his creation man will be faced with his real, his permanent problem – how to use his freedom from pressing economic cares, how to occupy the leisure, which science and compound interest will have won for him, to live wisely and agreeably and well. . . .

When the accumulation of wealth is no longer of high social importance, there will be great changes in the code of morals. We shall be able to rid ourselves of many of the pseudo-moral principles which have hagridden us for 200 years, by which we have exalted some of the most distasteful of human qualities into the position of the highest virtues. We shall be able to afford to dare to assess the money-motive at its true value. The love of money as a possession – as distinguished from the love of money as a means to the enjoyments and realities of life – will be recognized for what it is, a somewhat disgusting morbidity, one of those semi-criminal, semi-pathological prospensities which one hands over with a shudder to the specialists in mental diseases. All kinds of social customs and economic practices, affecting the distribution of wealth and of economic rewards and penalities, which we now maintain at all costs, however distasteful and unjust they may be in themselves, because they are tremendously useful in promoting the accumulation of capital, we shall then be free, at last, to discard. . . .

Do not let us overestimate the importance of the economic problem, or sacrifice to its supposed necessities other matters of greater and more permanent significance. It should be a matter for specialists – like dentistry. If economists could manage to get themselves thought of as humble, competent people, on a level with dentists, that would be splendid.

– *Essays in Persuasion, 1930*

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THE THREE INGREDIENTS

The political problem of mankind is to combine three things: Economic Efficiency, Social Justice and Individual Liberty. The first needs criticism, precaution, and technical knowledge; the second, an unselfish and enthusiastic spirit which loves the ordinary man; the third, tolerance, breadth, appreciation of the excellencies of variety and independence, which prefers, above everything, to give unhindered opportunity to the exceptional and to the aspiring. The second ingredient is the best possession of the great party of the Proletariate. But the first and third require the qualities of the party which, by its traditions and ancient sympathies, has been the home of Economic Individualism and Social Liberty. – *The New Republic, March 3, 1926*

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Integration – The Seven Lean Years

by Alexander M. Bickel

Three years ago this fall, the segregation problem in the South looked like the American Algeria. It was pervasive, affecting our national looks in almost every aspect. It was a heavy drain on the sense of national purpose and integrity. And it was, itself, adrift. The judicial process had reached the limit of its capacity. The second battle of Little Rock had been fought to a Pyrrhic victory. Schools were closed in Little Rock and in Virginia. Congress and the Presidency, each in its own way and for its own reasons, were immobilized.

At the time, the two battles of Little Rock seemed like First and Second Manassas. Today it is possible to see them as a Gettysburg, and to surmise that in the perspective of history they will represent the high water mark of segregation.

The initial reaction to the Court's 1954 school integration decision, it will be remembered, was quite encouraging. There were a few uncompromising comments, to be sure, by such as Herman Talmadge, then Governor of Georgia, and Senator Eastland of Mississippi. But Senator Byrd of Virginia called only for "exercise of the greatest wisdom," and for "sober and exhaustive consideration," which – having regard to the Byzantine style of the Virginia machine – was taken to be a hint that the faithful should avoid talk of abolishing the public schools. The Governor of Arkansas, Francis Cherry, said: "Arkansas will obey the law. It always has." Governor Stanley of Virginia promised to "work toward a plan which will be acceptable to our children and in keeping with the edict of the Court. Views of the leaders of both races will be invited. . . ." The Virginia Superintendent of Public Instruction, Dr. Dowell J. Howard, foreswore any defiance. "We are trying to teach school children the law of the land," he said, "and we will abide by it." Governor Shivers of Texas said that his state would comply, though it would take time. Border states were in fact complying. Elsewhere, there were active preparations for compliance, notably in none other than Little Rock, Arkansas.

Then what happened? The turning point was the Congressional Manifesto of March 11, 1956, which represented a calculated declaration of political war against the Court's decision, made in the hope of overturning it. The Manifesto attacked the legitimacy of the decision, attempting to drive a wedge between the Court and the symbol of its authority. The signers declared their continuing allegiance to the Constitution, but contended that the Court had itself violated it. This was the form of the attack. Its substance was that integration is wrong, unwise, intolerable, while segregation is just and convenient. Most Northern political leaders, with President Eisenhower at the head, took issue with the form of the attack only, and defended, in effect, only the form of the Court decision, that is, only its legitimacy, not its rightness. The Court, it was said, was authorized to construe the Constitution. The Court had spoken. The Court must be obeyed. There must be good order and peaceable submission to lawful authority. But, as the Southerners well knew, this was all beside the point.

The Southern leaders' attack upon the decision was based on their realization of an essential truth, which we don't often have occasion to observe, and which consequently dawned on the Southerners themselves somewhat late; hence the contrast between initial reactions and what followed. The Supreme Court's law, the Southern leaders realized, could not in our system prevail for long if it ran counter to deeply-felt popular needs or convictions, or even if it was opposed by a determined and substantial minority and received with indifference by the rest of the country. Their purpose, therefore, was to organize and maintain unbroken the ranks of a determined minority, and to test the convictions of the rest of the country. To respond, as did most Northern political leaders, and particularly the President, by invoking the legitimacy of the Court's constitutional function, and by making heavy drafts upon the Court's own prestige and mystique was to miss the point entirely. It was an attempt to support the Court by drawing on *its* resources, not by bringing to its aid those of the political institutions. It constituted no support at all. No wonder the Southerners thought for a season that success was within their grasp. No one had joined the decisive issue with them.

Having scented victory, the Southern leaders sought to assure it by turning from litigation and agitation to direct action by the use of mobs. This was a crucial mistake, though an understandable one. It was a calculated risk, which only hindsight shows up to have been wholly unwise. The action at Little Rock, following upon a visit from Governor Griffin of Georgia, was certainly not Mr. Faubus' alone, whether or not a full council of war was ever held, and whether or not it was unanimously agreed to. At any rate, it raised in much bolder fashion than before the issue of order, the peace of the community as against mob rule, and caused

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Inch by Inch

President Eisenhower to react. Too much cannot be made of this, however. Both in practice and in theory, the Executive is obliged to aid in the enforcement of specific judicial decrees that have been flouted. The Executive's own interest in good order is joined to that of the Judiciary, regardless of the merits of the decision that is to be enforced. But – as Mr. Eisenhower amply demonstrated – there are degrees of enthusiasm in rendering Executive support, and there are ways of emphasizing order above, rather than alongside of, the decision that is being enforced. The mob, after all, like revolution, is an ambiguous fact. The mob is bad when it is wrong; it may be heroic when it is right. It is surely a deeply ingrained American belief that mobs of our people do not generally gather to oppose good laws, and the very fact of a mob, therefore, puts the law in question. Fear of the mob, moreover, is an ambivalent feeling, for it is more easily satisfied, everything else being equal, by conceding what the mob wants, by redressing its grievances than by fighting it. And so a few enforcement crises like Little Rock, rather than hurting their cause, might well have gone far to win the Southern leaders' battle for them. The Court's integration principle would have been in train of being reversed, directly or by desuetude.

But there was another factor in play, and it roused Northern opinion, whose latent temper the Southern leaders had gravely misestimated. It is this factor that lent decisive consequence to the riots in Little Rock, abetted by such later skirmishes as in New Orleans last fall, at the University of Georgia during the winter, and in connection with the Freedom Rides this spring in Montgomery. Compulsory segregation, like states' rights and like "The Southern Way of Life," is an abstraction. These riots, which were brought instantly, dramatically and literally home to the American people, showed what it means concretely. Here were grown people furiously confronting their enemy: two, three, half-a-dozen scrubbed, starched, scared and incredibly brave colored children. The moral bankruptcy, the shame of the thing were evident. Television, it should be emphasized, as in the Army-McCarthy hearings, played a most significant role. There was an unforgettable scene, for example, in one CBS newscast from New Orleans, of a white mother fairly foaming at the mouth with the effort to rivet her distracted little boy's attention and teach him how to hate. And repeatedly, the ugly spitting monosyllable, NIGGER! The effect, achieved on an unprecedented number of people with unprecedented speed, must have been something like what used to happen to individuals (the young Lincoln among them) at the sight of an actual slave auction, or like the slower influence on Northern opinion of the fighting in "Bleeding Kansas" in 1854-55.

And so the Southern leaders had overplayed their hand. Mob action – not merely because it is disorderly, but because it concretized the abstraction of racism – led to the mobilization of Northern opinion to back up the Court's principle. Political opposition, it was clear, could defeat it. Only affirmative political support could save it. It was necessary for the political institutions, and most particularly, the President and aspirants to the Presidency, independently, on their own responsibility, to speak their moral approval of the Court's decision. Hiding behind the judges' skirts would not do.

Moral Sanction

The 1960 Presidential campaign marked the assumption of political responsibility for the principle of racial integration. And there has since been a world of difference between the tone of the Kennedy Administration on this subject and that of its predecessor, and a difference as well in the vigor and imagination of the litigating activity undertaken by the Department of Justice. This has made it possible for Southern moderates to be effective, as in Georgia last winter, and in Atlanta, New Orleans, Dallas, Little Rock and elsewhere this fall. Southern moderates could not be heard to any substantial purpose while the issue was in doubt, while a realistic chance of overturning the Court's principle seemed to remain. Only now – though

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perhaps romantic illusions still linger on the fringes of Southern opinion – is it at last quite clear that the issue is settled, the principle is established and is immutable.

This is the great achievement symbolized by an opening of schools this fall without any acute crisis. It is a great achievement, because the settlement and broad acceptance of a governing principle is a matter of the first importance in our society. Yet that is all that has been settled. The races are in principle to be integrated, in the school systems as in other facilities provided or supported by government. School authorities are to work toward this end, and are in any event to do nothing inconsistent with its eventual achievement. The position is restored to what it was during the first year and a half after the Court's initial judgment, while Southern reaction was for the most part calm and reluctantly acquiescent, and before the decision was challenged in the attempt to overturn it. Now the decision stands, the challenge is over, and the problem of achieving the goal of integration is before the country. There remain many specifically Southern difficulties about it, but the chief consequence will shortly be that the problem has been nationalized.

North As Well As South

The remaining difficulties that are specifically Southern cannot be minimized. Nothing at all has been done so far in Alabama, Mississippi and South Carolina, or in the great bulk of rural counties. And so we may yet see some further violence, but it will be very different than the concerted effort at Little Rock. The outcome is certain and the local officials concerned know it to be so. There may also be further temporary school closings. Even now, Prince Edward County, Virginia, operates no public schools. But litigation is catching up with the substitutes that have been improvised. For there can be no state aid to private segregated institutions, and it is not likely that they can long be operated without such aid. Thus, for example, a federal district court decision tightened the noose around the Prince Edward semi-private system just last month. Almost simultaneously, Louisiana's school-closing law was struck down at a time when, following a referendum, it was about to be put into effect in St. Helena Parish. Before acting, the three-judge federal court in Baton Rouge asked for argument on the question whether it is "implicit in today's concept of due process that a child has a right to a public school education," and whether for this reason it may not be unconstitutional to close public schools. The Justice Department argued the affirmative of the question, and this may ultimately be the legal position, although the court's actual decision in the St. Helena parish case was placed on a narrower ground.

Future movement in the South beyond token integration – once that has taken place throughout – will put in issue the administration of the Pupil Placement laws, under which Negro children are now being assigned to formerly all-white schools. How soon that will happen will depend on the amount of massive pressure that Southern Negro communities are ready to exert. The question in each case will, of course, be whether the administration of these laws is racially neutral. This line of litigation will before long reach the point where the problem assumes national scope, and is no longer specifically Southern. It is notorious that by far the larger number of colored children in Northern metropolitan areas attend schools that are *de facto* segregated, or very nearly so. As an able study by Mr. Will Maslow recently reported, segregation may be effectuated by present or past gerrymandering of a school district, "by arbitrary site selection, by manipulating transfer policies, by under-utilization of certain schools," and by like practices that do not on their face take race into account. In a ground-breaking case this spring, the federal courts have forced the New Rochelle, N.Y., school board to begin unscrambling a 94 percent Negro school which, as the courts found, had been initially gerrymandered to be *de facto* segregated and had then – again, as the courts found – been intentionally kept that way. The case points a long finger into the future.

Segregation was the national pattern for many generations following the Civil War. It was permitted by law in New York school districts that chose to have it till 1938. It existed in Kansas till struck down in one of the original school segregation cases in 1954. Only since then has it been abolished in at least one city each in California, Michigan and Ohio and in a number of communities in Illinois, Pennsylvania and New Jersey. During the past generation, the South has lagged behind the rest of the country by insisting upon an explicit, legally-enforced policy of segregation. This made no small difference. The goals we acknowledge determine the direction in which our society moves. Therefore, the seven years' struggle, now coming to a successful culmination, to establish, in the South as well as elsewhere, and gain acceptance for the principle of racial integration was a matter of immense importance to all of us.

The problem now broadens to encompass the entire position of the Negro throughout American society. It opens up, oddly enough, in circles that are at once concentric and intersecting. Schools, housing, employment, political participation. It is unnecessary to point out that neither the courts alone nor the federal government by itself are equal to finding and enforcing solutions. No doubt, the Southern states will continue to lag behind in practice, as they did in principle. But they must be led forward by Northern communities, as well as pushed by federal authorities.

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The Subversive Lord Russell

"The law," said Mr. Bumble, "is a ass, a idiot." The remark was made a century and a quarter ago, but it remains the only appropriate comment on such a legal absurdity as committing Bertrand Russell to jail because he, at age 89, will not swear to keep the Queen's peace; he chooses instead to agitate.

But that, of course, is viewing the incident from a rational standpoint. Viewed from the opposite angle, *i.e.*, the governmental, the question is, what was Bertrand Russell doing out of jail? He is a man who dares call his soul his own, therefore he is an offense and a threat to "every form of tyranny over the mind of man." No form of tyranny is more oppressive than the tyranny of fear, and a terrified government can by no means permit bold men to roam at large.

We know that only too well in this country. We never went quite the length of sending Lattimore and Oppenheimer to jail – although in the case of Lattimore we made a frantic effort to do so – for neither was ever as noisy as Bertrand Russell; but we effectively quarantined both from any contact with governmental policy. We deemed it essential, for courage is contagious, as well as panic, and a mere handful of the unterrified, left at large, might have infected the country to the total ruin of the ostrich policy we have pursued for the past dozen years.

To be sure, it was ineffective. Even without the injection of courage the ostrich policy has brought us to the brink of war – exactly to the spot we sought to avoid by rejecting both the courageous policies that were open to us after Korea. At that time bold men were divided into two camps. There were those who held, with MacArthur, that Communism represented total depravity, for which there was no cure except extermination; and there were those who held, as Roosevelt had believed, that Communism is merely a human aberration, a psychosis induced by misery and fear, amenable to treatment by removal of its causes.

There was much to be said, and much was said in support of both theories. But both were risky. Neither could have been adopted and rigorously applied except by a bold and resolute nation, confident of its own destiny. Which was the sounder we shall never know, for we rejected both. Instead of either extermination or medication we chose to rely on bluff and bluster; with the result that we are now precisely at the pass which we had hoped could be avoided.

There is, however, one difference – the policy o termination is no longer feasible. With a monopo nuclear weapons we seemed to have a fair chanc wiping out Soviet Russia by preventive war with r tively little damage to ourselves. Had we done i that time we might now be physically secure – se with the brand of Cain, and damned "from here eternity," but surviving as slavemaster of a cowe and trembling world. There are those who woul rather see this republic destroyed than see it converte into such a monster, but the thing was possible.

Failing that, the other bold course would have be to stake everything on the theory that Communism psychotic rather than diabolic. That would have volved bending every effort, for the past ten ye toward demonstrating to the Russian people that wh their misery may have been real enough, their fe are largely groundless. It might not have worked, f there is convincing evidence now that in Stalin we w dealing with a madman whose case had gone beyo any hope of cure. But there is always the possibil that we might have discovered years earlier Stalin's death revealed, namely, that there were in Russia who knew that the man was mad and arc ly wished to be delivered from his grip.

But we refused to take the risk and instead ta about "massive retaliation," surrounding Russia wi ring of bases prepared at the word of command t release the furies of hell upon her. If her psychological balance has steadily deteriorated, is it any wonder? Tradition has it that two hundred years ago Jonathan Edwards, preaching on "Sinners In the Hands of an Angry God," scared half of New England into the fold; but John Foster Dulles, on the same subject, seems only to have convinced the Russians that Stalin himself was no crazier than these Americans.

For insisting that the theory we rejected should still be applied Lord Russell is now sentenced to jail. Legally in the American view, that is where he belongs, for it is an article of faith with us that "the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail"; but the fact that a man is legally in jail doesn't prove that his ideas are wrong, for it is also part of our faith that "that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable," and a will to national suicide is not reasonable.

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earch of a Moral Style

ng Howe

eneration of American writers an publishing shortly after the orld War, the crisis of tradition- s was no longer a problem in e way it had been for writers in 19th Century. By now the crisis ues was an accepted fact, and fore not so much a painful con- on toward which their novels and s might reach as a necessary as- tion from which their novels and s had to begin.

ps the most vivid account of this eneration of writers, a generation as to reach its finest achievement the mid-twenties, has come from et and critic John Peale Bishop. In say "The Missing All" – the title en from an Emily Dickinson poem egins "The missing All prevented om missing minor things" – Bish- ribed how the young literary rning from the war felt they en cheated not merely of health e but more important, of truth or. They formed "really the first generation in America. There en groups before, but they were ted by a communion of youth, a of experience shared and ene- encountered. . . ." They felt them- to be cut off from the world of all had come immediately before em, all who spoke with authority. ey were not in rebellion against the olitical order of Western capitalism, ut in revulsion from its moral dis- rder. As Bishop wrote:

"The most tragic thing about the war was not that it made so many dead men, but that it destroyed the tragedy of death. Not only did the young suffer in the war, but every abstraction that would have sustained and given dignity to their suffering. The war made the traditional morality inacceptable; it did not annihilate it; it revealed its immediate inadequacy. So that at its end the survivors were left to face, as they could, a world without values."

For writers like Hemingway, Fitzgerald, Cummings and the early Dos Passos there could no longer be any question of clinging to traditional values. But more important, there could not even be a question of trying to find a new set of values; they were beyond such ambitions or delusions, they knew it was their lot to spend their lives in uncertainty, and the problem that troubled them most was how to do this without violating their feelings about courage and dignity. To be sure, the very desire to find an honorable style of survival in a time of moral confusion indicated a certain strength of moral intent, and the hope of preserving courage and dignity while experiencing a crack-up of values implies the continued hold of certain values. Even these, however, become gravely problematic when they are raised to the level of a troubled self-consciousness.

These writers went through just this kind of crisis. Almost by instinct they backed away from large-scale beliefs or ideals; they had had enough of "idealism," and lived in a magnified fear of platitudes. They had given up, if they had ever had it, the hope of achieving a coherent moral perspective; they were concerned with something more desperate, more fragmentary, more immediate. They were struggling to survive, as men of sensibility who had lost their way and knew it. The best of these writers were in search of what I propose to call a *moral style*. I mean by this improvised phrase: a series of tentative embodiments in conduct of a moral outlook they could not bring to full statement; or a series of gestures and rituals that would be made to serve as a substitute for a moral outlook that could no longer be summoned; or a fragmentary code of behavior by which to survive decently, as if there were – the drama consisting in the fact that there is not – a secure morality behind it. The search for a moral style, which I take to be fundamental to the best American writing between the First World War and the depression years, is a search undertaken by men who have learned that a life constricted to the standard of *faute de mieux* can still be a rigorous, even an exalting obligation. Or to put it in more homely terms, the idea of moral style is a 20th Century equivalent of the New England notion of "making do." How one "makes do," whether with grace or falsity, courage or evasion, is the great problem.

The great problem, above all, is in the work of the most influential American novelist of our time, Ernest Hemingway. Who, by now, is not familiar with the shape and colors of Hemingway's world? His recurrent figures are literary expatriates in the wastes of *nada*, bullfighters who have lost their nerve and skill, rich young men without purpose, wounded soldiers who would sign "a separate peace" in order to withdraw from the world's battles, distraught young women grasping at physical sensation as if it were a mode of salvation, tired gangsters, homeless cafe-sitters, stricken Spaniards: men and women always on the margin, barely able to get by from day to day. There emerges from this gallery of figures the characteristic hero of the Hemingway world: the hero who is wounded but bears his wound in silence, who is sensitive but scorns to devalue his feelings into words, who is defeated but finds a remnant of dignity in an honest confrontation of defeat. In almost all of Hemingway's books there is a tacit assumption that the deracination of our life is so extreme, everyone must find a psychic shelter of his own, a place in which to make a last stand.

But note: to make a last stand – for if

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defeat is accepted in Hemingway's world, humiliation and rout are not. His fictions present moments of violence, crisis and death, yet these become occasions for a stubborn, quixotic resistance through which the human capacity for satisfying its self-defined obligations is both asserted and tested. "Grace under pressure": this becomes the ideal stance, the hoped-for moral style, of Hemingway's characters. Or as he put it in describing Romero's bullfighting style in *The Sun Also Rises:* "the holding of his purity of line through the maximum of exposure."

It may be true, as Edmund Wilson claims, that Hemingway showed a taste for scenes of killing, but at his best he wished to squeeze from them some precarious assertion – or perhaps more accurately, some credible facsimile – of value. The Hemingway hero turns to his code, a mixture of stylized repression and inarticulate decencies, so that manners become the outer sign of an inexpressible heroism and gestures the substance of a surviving impulse to moral good. And what is this code? The determination to be faithful to one's own experience, not to fake emotions or pretend to sentiments that are not there; the belief that loyalty to one's few friends matters more than the claims and dogmas of the world; the insistence upon avoiding self-pity and public displays; the assumption that the most precious feelings cannot be articulated and that if the attempt is made they turn "rotten"; the desire to salvage from the collapse of social life a version of stoicism that can make suffering bearable; the hope that in direct physical sensation, the cold water of the creek in which one fishes or the purity of the wine made by Spanish peasants, there will be found an experience that can resist corruption (which is one reason Hemingway approached these sensations with a kind of propitiatory awe, seldom venturing epithets more precise than "fine" and "nice," as if he feared to risk a death through naming). Life now consists in keeping an equilibrium with one's nerves, and that requires a tight control over one's desires, so that finally one learns what one cannot have and then even not to want it, and above all, not to make a fuss while learning. As Jake Barnes says in *The Sun Also Rises:* "I did not care what it was all about. All I wanted was how to live in it."

A code pressing so painfully on the nervous system and so constricted in symbolic gratifications is almost certain to break down – indeed, in his later work Hemingway often shows that it does. After a time, however, his devotion to this code yielded him fewer and fewer psychic returns, since it is in the nature of the quest for a moral style

Haiti

(Mood For Maracas)

In the Quarter of the Negroes
Where the palms and coconuts
Cha cha like castanets
In the wind's frenetic fists,
Where the sand seeds and the
Sea gourds make maracas out of me,
Erzulie plays a tune
On the bongo of the moon.
The papa drum of sun
And the mother drum of earth
Love tourists only for the
Money that they're worth.
In the Quarter of the Negroes
Mama Mamacita Papa Papiemento
Damballa Wedo Ogun and the horse
That lugged the first white
First white tourist up the mountain
To the Citadelle of shadows shadows
Where the shadows of the Negroes
Are the ghosts of former glory
Toussaint with a thread
Thread still pulls his
Prow of stone stone.
I boil a fish and salt it
(And my plantains)
With his glory.

Sunsets stained with blood
Clear green crystal water
And the cry that turned to music
Where the sea sand and the sea gourds
Make claves of my sorrows:
Mamacita! Papa Legba! Shango!
Damballa Wedo! The Virgin! Bedward!
John Jasper! Jesus! Daddy Grace!

I tried
Lord knows I tried
Damballa
I prayed
Lord knows I prayed
Daddy
I climbed
Up that steep hill
The Virgin
With a cross
Lord knows I climbed
But when I got
John Jasper Jesus
When I got to calvary
Up there on that hill
Already there was three –
And one, yes, one
Was black
As me.

Cha Cha . . . . .
Cha Cha . . . . .
Cha . . . . .

LANGSTON HUGHES

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that the very act of approaching or even finding it sets off a series of discoveries as to its radical limitations. As a result the later Hemingway, in his apparent satisfaction with the moral style he had improvised, began to imitate and caricature himself; the manner becomes that of the tight-lipped tough guy, and the once taut and frugal prose turns corpulent.

At first glance, F. Scott Fitzgerald's novels seem closer to the social portraiture of Edith Wharton than to the oral fables of Hemingway. Few American writers have commanded so fine a use of social gradations, not merely terms of class relationships but even more in the subtle nuances of status which in our country often replace or disguise class relationships. Fitzgerald is a writer very much of the historical moment, the laureate of the twenties, the *wunderkind* of the jazz age, and his talent, profligacy and tragic personal fate seem symbolic tokens of that historical moment. But in addition to the Fitzgerald who made of his "extreme environmental sense" a foundation of a gift for rendering social manners, there was the Fitzgerald who had been fired and driven by a vision of earthly beatitude which, all through his life, allowed him neither rest nor fulfillment.

Fitzgerald was an eternal adolescent infatuated with the surfaces of material existence. He worshipped money, he worshipped glamor, he worshipped youth, but above all, he worshipped the three together in a totality of false values. Like Keats before the bake shop, he stared with a deep yearning at the blessings of the rich, the ease and security with which they moved through the years, apparently free from the tyranny of work and the burden of circumstances, and thereby enabled to cultivate their own sense of what life might be. He thought that in the American dream of money there lay imbedded a possibility of human realization, because money means power and when you have power you can do anything – you can even, as Jay Gatsby proposes, obliterate the past. He felt that youth was the greatest of human possessions, indeed a kind of *accomplishment* for which the young should be praised. His work was a glittering celebration of immaturity, the American fear of aloneness and limitation.

The preceding paragraph condenses the kind of critical attacks to which Fitzgerald was subject during his career: it is true, all of it true, but not the whole truth about his writing.

For the man who composed *The Great Gatsby* and *The Last Tycoon* was a writer who had gone to war against the unexamined convictions of his youth, and at a terrible price in suffering and blood, had triumphed. This writer noted that "all the stories that came into my head had a touch of disaster in them – the lovely young creatures in my novels went to ruin, the diamond mountains of my short stories blew up, my millionaires were as beautiful and damned as Thomas Hardy's peasants." Fitzgerald knew – it was to anchor this knowledge that he put Nick Carraway into *The Great Gatsby* as narrator – that the vitality and ambition of Jay Gatsby were lavished on "a vast, vulgar and meretricious beauty." He knew – it was to release this knowledge that he created the looming figure of Monroe Stahr in *The Last Tycoon* – that "life is essentially a cheat and its conditions are those of defeat, and that the redeeming things are not 'happiness and pleasure' but the deeper satisfactions that come out of struggle." As one of Fitzgerald's critics, Andrews Wanning, has remarked: "his style keeps reminding you . . . of his sense of the enormous beauty of which life, suitably ornamented, is capable; and at the same time of his judgment as to the worthlessness of the ornament and the corruptibility of the beauty."

The preceding paragraph condenses the kind of critical praise with which Fitzgerald was honored in the years after his death; it is true, all of it true, but only if one also remembers how accurate were the attacks against him.

Yet there is more to Fitzgerald than this counterposition of early illusion and later self-discovery. In his best writing – which consists not merely of one or two novels and several stories but also of a succession of extraordinary passages appearing almost anywhere in his books, like sudden flares of beauty and wisdom – Fitzgerald confronted both early illusion and later self-discovery from a certain ironic distance. Supremely American that he was, Fitzgerald tried to preserve some-

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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thing of the sense of human potentiality which had first led him to be enticed by the vulgarity of money and the shallowness of youth. He knew how important, and finally irrelevant, was that depreciation of material values in the name of some moralistic ideal which had become a set attitude in American thought and writing; he sensed that, endlessly rehearsed, this depreciation had actually come to reinforce the power of material values, partly because it could not come to grips with the society that drove men to concern themselves with money and partly because any claim of indifference to such a concern was in America likely to be a mere Sunday pose. As Fitzgerald had worshipped wealth, youth and glamour, they were surely false; as he later turned upon them, his turning was true; but even in his turning he kept some essential part of his earlier worship, and – one is inclined to say – he was right to do so.

Where Hemingway had tried to salvage a code for men at the margin of society, Fitzgerald tried to construct a vision of human possibility at its center. He enjoyed neither doctrinal support in religion nor a buoying social goal nor even a firm awareness of traditional culture that might have helped him sustain and enlarge this vision. Fitzgerald was struggling to achieve something of vast importance for our society, even though he could hardly have named it and we, in turn, can seldom enlarge upon it. He tried to create a moral style out of the sheer urgencies of desire and talent, and finally it came to a search, at the very least, for a mode of gracefulness in outer life and, at the very best, for some token of grace in a world where grace could no longer be provided by anyone but man himself.

Willam Faulkner, last of the three major American novelists to begin writing in the decade after the First World War, enjoyed a more secure sense of social place and moral tradition than either Hemingway or Fitzgerald. The impact of the fundamentalist Protestantism of the South was still fresh to his imagination, even if more as a discipline than a dogma; the power of a commanding historical myth, the myth of heroic Southern resistance and defeat in the Civil War, was everywhere to be felt in the world of his youth; and the idea of kinship, a deep tacit awareness of the bonds of family and clan, was still a reality in his early experience, as it would later be in the series of novels set in his imaginary Yoknapatawpha County.

In one major respect, however, Faulkner began as a thoroughly "modern" writer, caught up with the same emotions of uprootedness and uncertainties of value which afflicted Hemingway: his early novels *Soldiers' Pay* and *Sartoris* reflect, though not nearly so well as those of Hemingway, the belief of a generation that it is adrift, "lost" in the aftermath of a terrible war. Provincial though the early Faulkner was, he had nevertheless been bruised by troubles of the outer world, and for all his attachment to the Southern homeland he always retained a lively conviction as to the pervasiveness of malaise in modern life. But as a man and writer he had available resources which both Hemingway and Fitzgerald lacked. Where Hemingway turned in his novels and stories to a marginal world he had partly observed and partly imagined, and Fitzgerald tried to impose his vision of human possibility upon such recalcitrant material as the lives of the very rich and very young, Faulkner could still turn back to a living segment of American society – back to the familiar places of the South, the homeland he knew with an intimacy beyond love or hate. Until shortly before he began to write, the South had possessed a compact and homogenous culture, and the exploration of the virtues and guilts of this culture, as well as the testing of its myth, became for him a life-long preoccupation.

Each of Faulkner's novels written during his great creative outburst – from *The Sound and the Fury* in 1929 to *Go Down, Moses* in 1942 – represents an increasingly severe and fundamental criticism of the homeland. Not merely of the South alone, to be sure; for when Faulkner composed his despairing estimate of social loss in *The Sound and the Fury* he was also portraying some of the central disabilities of modern civilization. But the foreground subject in the Yoknapatawpha novels is the immediate present and recent past of the South. At every point in these novels Faulkner had available – or wrote as if there were still available – persons, places and principles to which he could look for moral support and standards. He *turned back*, as neither Hemingway nor Fitzgerald could, to the hillsmen, the poor farmers, the Negroes and the children, all of whom seemed to him apart and pure, surviving in the interstices of a decadent society, unable significantly to change its course, yet vital enough to

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serve him as figures of moral and dramatic contrast.

Now in what is obviously a simplification, one can regard the whole development of Faulkner's Yoknapatawpha saga as a gradual discovery that these figures prove less and less competent as moral guides for the contemporary world. That Faulkner clearly understands as much as is suggested by the history of Ratliff, the choric figure in the Snopes trilogy who is so marvellously self-assured in *The Hamlet* but so fumbling in *The Mansion* when he must approach the modern South. Faulkner has been exhausting the psychic and moral resources he had supposed to be present for him in the world of Yoknapatawpha; slowly, he has been emerging to the same needs and bewilderments that other writers now feel. The idea of a return to primitive simplicity retains its strength in Faulkner's books insofar as it is kept by him at a certain distance from the present, or can be recognized as metaphor rather than prescription.

In his later books Faulkner still turns for moral contrast and support to the kinds of characters he had admired in the earlier ones – the back-country saints, the earthy madonnas, the Negroes, the children, the good simple men. But now it is with very little of the old conviction: you need only contrast his use of Nancy in *Requiem for a Nun* with Dilsey in *The Sound and the Fury*. He turns to such figures because he has nowhere else to go, but he turns to them, I would suggest, not with any firm conviction as to their moral power but simply in the hope of imposing on and through them his hopes and standards.

The search for moral style is recurrent in modern writing. It places tremendous burdens upon literature, almost the burden of demanding that literature provide us with norms of value we find impossible to locate in experience. It tends to demand from literature a kind of prophetic gratification which would have seemed decidedly strange to earlier generations of readers. Yet precisely this aspect of the work of such modern figures as Hemingway, Fitzgerald and Faulkner makes them seem so close to us, so very much the spokesmen for our needs and our desires.

Defects and Virtues

Much Ado About Nothing
A Midsummer Night's Dream
Richard II
New York Shakespeare Festival
(Central Park)

Since the New York Shakespeare Festival filled me with much satisfaction this summer, I am perhaps ungrateful to insist on the total euphoria I experienced in previous years; but the 1961 season failed to invoke in me that feeling of beaming beatitude I have learned to expect from this remarkable troupe. In the defection, before the summer began, of his most gifted director, and in the apparent desertion of his most dependable comic actors, Joseph Papp suffered losses which undoubtedly impaired the quality of his productions; yet, more profound difficulties than mere problems of personnel could be detected in the season's offerings.

Granted that a few individual performances were not as inspired as usual this summer, the company as a whole still managed to display its customary virtues: the trouble was that, through a complex of circumstances, the defects of these virtues had finally become apparent as well.

The special trademark of Papp's group, and the quality which makes it so peculiarly American, has always been its volatile, ripsnorting, rough-and-ready style. But while broad comedy, boisterous physical action, colloquial speech patterns, and broken line rhythms are perfectly appropriate to Shakespeare's more masculine and action-filled plays, one begins to hear the tinkle of shattered china when these techniques are applied to works of delicacy, lyricism, and grace. Similarly, Papp's laudable disdain for the star system has helped to turn his company into one of the smoothest ensembles in America, but he has not yet developed an actor commanding enough to interpret the larger Shakespeare roles with as much expertise as the smaller ones are always played. In previous seasons, a shrewd balancing of the repertory managed to disguise these limitations, but this summer's program sometimes seemed beyond the company's range.

Much Ado About Nothing, directed by Papp himself, was located in Goya's Spain where stiff-backed caballeros in cocked hats and grand ladies in mantillas and lace played shuffleboard, pursued butterflies, and flourished fans against a background of amorous intrigue, their conversation punctuated by the castanet-snapping and heel-clicking of Flamenco dances. Though it sometimes inclined perilously towards the gimmickry associated with the American Stratford, this production was distinguished by a color, dash, and verve which made it far more expansive and balletic than Gielgud's static treatment of three seasons ago. Papp directed the work as if he were aware of the obscure pun in the title (*Nothing* was once an Elizabethan homonym for *noting* or observing), carefully heightening the various eavesdropping se-

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quences which further and complicate the action; and his playful handling of the Claudio-Hero plot not only rejuvenated these usually tedious episodes but even made certain related scenes seem more crisp and gay (Beatrice's "Kill Claudio," for example, was read, and actually assumed a crazy relevance, as a laugh line).

Despite the skillful modulations of Nan Martin's laconic Beatrice, however, the wit badinage was rather heavy and flat. Jack Cannon apparently confused his Benedick with Petruchio, a role he had successfully essayed the previous season, because he roared, rasped, and croaked his lines with such misogynistic spleen that they sounded like instruments of aggression rather than the armor of a vulnerable heart; and his pacing was so eccentric that it muddled the rhythms of the entire production. Without this deft clash of wits, *Much Ado* is a shell of a plot; and all the ingenuity in the world will not redeem the work from dullness.

A Midsummer Night's Dream, the second Festival production, skirted as close to disaster as anything I can remember seeing in the Park. With all the lyric speeches either trimmed or cut completely to accommodate some inordinately long and relentlessly unfunny spurts of horseplay, this bodiless and dreamlike creation assumed a gross, waking physicality which made it seem peculiarly lumpish and sensual (these qualities even penetrated the forest scenes where Puck was found necking with some spirits and Titania could be seen bussing Bottom on the hairy mouth of his ass' head.) What is more, the lovers were too frenetic; the court too vulgar; the rustics too strained; and the fairies either too elephantine (Oberon's train) or too fussy (Titania's). Most of these gaucheries were attributable to Joel Friedman's awkward direction, but some were the result of casting, the most baffling in the Festival's history. Albert Quinton, gifted enough as a character actor but no comedian, was a dull Bottom; John Call, the more obvious choice for Bottom, grappled with Puck, playing him like an exhausted clown too lethargic to pull his weight, much less to put a girdle round about the earth in forty minutes; and Philip Kenneally, as Theseus, seemed to have gleaned his notions of regal dignity from a reading of *Ubu Roi*. And so I had the unhappy experience of seeing one of Shakespeare's loveliest and most fragile works so badly mauled that the stage seemed littered with mangled limbs.

The last production of the season, *Richard II*, was also the most compelling, especially in the initial acts where the play hinges on ceremony and external conflict. Making admirable use of Eldon Elder's simple, flexible setting and Lewis Brown's illustrative costuming, Gladys Vaughan, the director, populated Richard's court with gypsies, jugglers, dwarfs, magicians, and effeminate courtiers, thus evoking an atmosphere of Oriental splendor which contrasted strikingly with the manly simplicity of the Machiavel, Bolinbroke, and his followers, and thus emphasizing visually Shakespeare's undramatized suggestion that Richard's parasitical caterpillars are eating up the commonwealth.

In the second half of the work, however, which shifts into an internal study of Richard, Mrs. Vaughan's production was somewhat less successful. Ben Hayes created a frivolous, self-indulgent, quixotic ruler who, in glorious golden armor, looked like a magnificent sun-king; but he failed to capture the narcissistic aspect of Richard who is, after all, an actor and a poseur (he is always setting a dramatic scene and then assuming the leading role). Therefore, in the deposition scene, Hayes – instead of suggesting the enjoyment Richard takes in his self-pity and attitudinizing – played for straightforward emotions of sincerity and grief, thus robbing the character of its most interesting psychological quirk. Nevertheless, this was a firmly controlled production, in which Papp's company so effectively demonstrated its celebrated gifts as an ensemble that I left the theater convinced there were no problems it could not ultimately solve, considering the care, taste, imagination, and originality with which it was so plentifully endowed.

ROBERT BRUSTEIN

liberation *for september features "facts and fictions about berlin" by* **erich fromm;** *"latin america and u.s. policy" by* **carleton beals;** *and two articles by participants in* **the freedom rides:** *albert bigelow, skipper of the "golden rule" and william mahoney, a student at howard university.*

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MOVIES

To Hell With Bergman

The Museum of Modern Art in New York has just issued a sad little brochure called *The Cinema of Orson Welles*, sad because it ought to be called *The Maimed and Non-existent Cinema of Orson Welles*. In twenty years Welles has been permitted to film only seven of his projects, only one of which *(Citizen Kane)* was released in the form approved by him.

Compare this with the "cinema" of Ingmar Bergman. In 16 years he has directed 22 films, and it can be assumed that he had control of the final versions of most of them – perhaps of all. The difference is not in talent; Bergman has not yet made a film as consistently good as *Kane*. The difference is a socio-economic one between Sweden and the US. Bergman has written that, during the filming of *The Virgin Spring* in a northern province, he and the cast and crew stopped work to watch some cranes fly over, then ran to the top of a hill to see them better. "And suddenly I thought: this is what it means to make a movie in Sweden. This is what can happen, this is how we work together with our old equipment and little money . . . how we can suddenly drop everything for the love of four cranes floating above the tree tops."

A particular beauty of this situation – being an artist with a cosmos to roam in instead of spending your life in a basically hostile world looking for jobs – is that it gives the director a healthy chance to vary and to frisk. Bergman's latest film, *The Devil's Eye*, he calls a *rondo capriccioso*, and when I saw the words, I thought, "What luxury."

He has evidently had a good time making this film but has not completely avoided the pitfall in such cases of having a better time than his audience. Any criticism of a Bergman film begins, of course, with the fact that it is far above the general run and deserves a cultivated person's attention. However, *The Devil's Eye* – of all his films since 1955 – seems the one least worth Bergman's time, even as a caprice.

The Devil's Eye (Janus)
Loss of Innocence (Columbia)

The title comes from an Irish proverb which I suspect, was invented by Bergman: "A woman's chastity is a sty in the Devil's eye." We begin in Hell where a rotund Devil in modern dress has a sty caused by a Swedish vicar's virtuous daughter. He chooses Don Juan, of all his guests, to return to earth and rectify the matter before her marriage. The Don is being subjected to exquisite punishment; he is continually visited by beautiful ladies whom he once had conquered and who, just as they acquiesce again, vanish. Satan agrees to shorten Juan's punishment if he will sully the vicar's daughter.

Juan fails. But he falls in love (quite understandably, since she is played by Bibi Andersson) with the girl, and his torment is intensified by unrequited love. However the term is reduced because Satan's sty is cured: as a result of Juan's visit, the girl tells her husband a little lie on their wedding night.

To tackle the Don Juan theme is to invite comparison with some impressive predecessors. In their light *The Devil's Eye* fades, despite the fact that Bergman rings some wry changes on the story: as when Juan, incognito, tells the adventures of Don Giovanni to the marveling vicar and his family.

Bergman is one of the film world's most seductive directors for the eye, but he has also always relied substantially on dialogue. In fact he has written most of his screenplays himself.



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This film is a high comedy, which by definition lives principally through dialogue, and unlike *Smiles of a Summer Night*, the compass is relatively small, thus focusing the work inward on its dialogue still more acutely. The subtitles are good, but I have the feeling that even Swedes may feel that this film is excessively verbal.

Bergman uses all his magical repertoire to compensate for this; and the photography (by Gunnar Fischer) has the peculiar Bergmanesque quality of sharp outline and soft shadow. But the level of sheer entertainment in the film is not consistently high, and the total contribution to art-work on the subject of Juan is small. Let us say that it is one of the Bergman films that are worth only one viewing.

Jarl Kulle is perhaps not your idea of history's champion amorist, but he can suggest dignity and depth. Sture Lagerwall (Pablo) has a tight-skinned, seamed, striking face which he uses to advantage. And Miss Andersson is one of those girls whom all the males in the audience want to marry.

By its title alone *Loss of Innocence* warrants discussion in the same breath, but in its own right it is a film of some charm and humanity. Adapted from Rumer Godden's novel *The Greengage Summer*, it tells the story of four English children, the oldest a girl of 16, who are "stranded" one summer holiday in a French chateau-hotel when their mother is hospitalized. The relationship among the children is like that in Miss Godden's *The Rover:* chummy and uncloying. The oldest girl, Joss, changes from school uniforms to clinging frocks, discovers herself, and is discovered by Kenneth More, a mysterious Englishman who lives there with the proprietor, Danielle Darrieux. A delicate, not-quite-sexual relationship develops between More and the girl (played with plump appeal by Susannah York), and thus she finds herself a corner of a triangle with the worldly Miss Darrieux. The summer brings Joss some explication of the man's mystery and a confrontation of somewhat larger mysteries. The film's effect is cozy-English-novel: as if you were watching it in slippers, before a modest fire, sipping tea.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

Correspondence

Escape from the Bomb

Sirs:

The very interesting article "Escape From the Bomb" (September 4) raises a number of questions. If I understand the authors correctly, they are suggesting an explanation of mass apathy in the face of nuclear danger, a danger which they describe as being of enormous magnitude and likelihood. They appear to agree with the popular suspicion that Civil Defense measures are futile, and add that "the only way individuals in nuclear target areas can safeguard themselves is to run away soon enough." Since people are not fleeing, there must therefore be some explanation of their peculiar indifference to the bomb, and the most plausible one the authors are able to find is that the apathetic are resorting to one or another psychological defense mechanism (denial, isolation, or rationalization) to escape the reality of this threat.

There are two puzzling features about this explanation. To begin with, the authors do not consider the possibility that the bulk of the population may be uninformed about the character and extent of the danger. Of course everyone realizes that there are nuclear weapons, that they go off with a big bang, and that they slay millions of people at a stroke. However, I think it is very doubtful that there is widespread awareness of the variety of ways in which a nuclear accident might occur. I fail to see how apathy can count for evidence of escapism until we first establish that most of those who are apathetic are actually informed of the peril.

But this is not the principal objection to the explanation. What I find most surprising is that Mr. Grinspoon and Mr. Lieberman should regard flight as the only rational response to the situation. Surely one can recognize the measure of the threat and refuse to flee nonetheless because one believes it would be cowardly to do so. This may not be one of the "categorical responses to danger," but it is one of the reasons people commonly give for their behavior. And would such an attitude be

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unreasonable? For my part, I cannot imagine anything more calculated to provoke Soviet nuclear terrorism than the spectacle of millions of American citizens emigrating to South America.

I think it is fair to accuse the authors of holding flight to be the only rational response despite the fact that they draw a distinction between those who remain unperturbed by the risks of thermonuclear war (the apathetic) and those "who acknowledge the dangers." For the latter, there are two alternatives: either to organize and do something about the bomb or to flee. But since "doing something about it" consists in subscribing to one of three slogans (rather dead than Red; neither dead nor Red; or rather Red than dead), and since "the individual is powerless to remove the bomb from the Cold War," the authors do not seem to have a very high regard for the rationality of this type of response. The most they have to say for it is that such action "serves to reduce anxiety."

The overriding importance the authors lay on physical survival parallels their peculiar concept of the Cold War. Starting from the premise that "the greater enemy to survival" is the bomb and not the enemy, they observe that "there is tremendous fear, anger and suspicion among nations – far more than is felt about the bomb, which threatens all nations alike." This situation is not commensurate with the premise, hence: "We suggest that people discharge their feelings of helplessness in the face of the bomb by transferring their anger to the more easily personified 'enemy'." Now *I* suggest that Drs. Grinspoon and Mr. Lieberman have things precisely backwards. It is not that we transfer our feelings about the bomb to the enemy, but rather that the bomb exists because of our feelings about the enemy. And even if the bomb represents the greatest threat to survival, the enemy represents the greatest threat to everything that makes survival valuable.

One parting shot: the authors go beyond dwelling on the nightmare of thermonuclear war to maintain that "the likelihood of its occurrence is consistent with the data at hand and, as well, the history and nature of man." This is not informed speculation, it is sheer prophesy. It makes perfectly good sense to say, statistically speaking, that the greater the number of nuclear nations, the more people there are in a position to detonate a nuclear weapon, and the more weapons there are, the greater the likelihood of a disaster occurring *than* there would be if these numbers were smaller. But demonstrating this and demonstrating that a total nuclear war is more likely to occur than not is something quite different. I do not know how one would go about showing this kind of a likelihood. Certainly "history" and "the nature of man" (whatever they mean) will not be sufficient. Nor will it do to point out that because we will soon have twice as many nuclear powers the danger of war will be twice or thrice (or whatever it is) as great. Twice as great as what? Perhaps if we knew for certain that a psychotic nihilist is in a position to start a nuclear war (not just to have an "accident") talk about such a likelihood would be justified. Although even then such knowledge might alter the likelihood.

Thomas H. Rekdal
Ithaca, New York

Liberal's Dilemma

Sirs:

Thank you for Paul Lauter's candid review "In the Hands of the Enemy," September 11) stating the American liberal's dilemma between magnetic poles: that of the Marxist who lives to rectify the shallow people produced by American culture and the militarist who, zealous to save America, exists entirely in terms of "the blind, hateful responses of war." So many feel – so few dare to confront – his question: "Can there be in a world of total war a middle ground between extremes willing to employ any means to achieve their unquestioned goals?" The apparent answer is terrifying.

Yet one recalls Camus' position in 1946, following his moral commitment to murder while in the French Resistance and, of course, following Hiroshima: "I could no longer hold to any truth which might oblige me, directly or indirectly, to demand a man's life."

Allan Brick
Goucher College

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

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

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